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Complex networks often have a modular structure, where a number of tightly-
connected groups of nodes (modules) have relatively few interconnections. Mod-
ularity had been shown to have an important effect on the evolution and stability
of biological networks [1], on the scalability and efficiency of large-scale infras-
tructure [2, 3], and the development of economic and social systems [4, 5]. An
analytical framework for understanding modularity and its effects on network
vulnerability is still missing. Through recent advances in the understanding
of multilayer networks [6–8], however, it is now possible to develop a theo-
retical framework to systematically study this critical issue. Here we study,
analytically and numerically, the resilience of modular networks under attacks
on interconnected nodes, which exhibit high betweenness values [9, 10] and are
often more exposed to failure [3, 11–13]. Our model provides new understand-
ings into the feedback between structure and function in real world systems,
and consequently has important implications as diverse as developing efficient
immunization strategies, designing robust large-scale infrastructure, and under-
standing brain function.
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2Network science has become a leading approach to the study of emergent collective phe-
nomena in complex systems, with a wide range of applications to fundamental real word
systems [14]. Many real world systems have been shown to exhibit a modular structure, in
which smaller clusters of nodes are connected more to each other than to the network at
large, which is key to their behavior and functioning [15–18]. For example, recent studies of
biological networks show that the deletion of nodes connecting between modules can have
a deleterious effect on the network integrity [19], efficiency [20], and stability [21]. Here
we provide an analytical framework for studying the robustness of modular networks in the
presence of attacks on interconnected nodes. We study a percolation process on networks
consisting of a varying number of modules, m, and a varying number of interconnected
nodes. The analytical solution reveals two percolation regimes separated by a critical num-
ber of modules m∗: for m < m∗ one needs to remove all interconnected nodes to break the
system, while the modules are almost unaffected internally. In contrast, for m > m∗ one
needs to remove only a fraction of the interconnected nodes, before the system collapses.
This is due to the fact that for m > m∗ the number of interconnected nodes is high and
partial removal of these breaks the modules internally, which helps to bring about the rapid
collapse of the whole system. Our approach can also be used to study analytically attacks
on high betweenness centrality nodes, which in modular structures, correspond to intercon-
nected nodes. Such attacks, which have only been studied numerically so far, are considered
to be among the most harmful attack strategies [9, 10].
We consider a modular network with N nodes divided into m equal sized modules. Sim-
ilarly to [16], we define pin as the probability to connect nodes in the same module and
pout as the probability to connect nodes in different modules. Thus, the total number of
intra-module (inter-module) links is given by the probability for a link pin (pout) multiplied
by the number of possible links yielding
Min = pin
N(N
m
− 1)
2
, (1)
Mout = pout
N(m− 1)N
m
2
. (2)
We define α to be the ratio between the probabilities for an intra- and inter-module link
α =
pin
pout
. (3)
3In Fig. 1(a)-(c) we present an example of modular networks generated with different values of
α, and visualized using force-directed layout, which has been shown to demonstrate network
modularity [22] . Note that the ratio between the number of inter-modules links and intra-
module links depends not only on α, but also on the number of modules
Min
Mout
=
pin(
N
m
− 1)
pout(m− 1)Nm
∼ pin
pout(m− 1) =
α
m− 1 . (4)
Thus, our model is taking into consideration that systems comprised of more modules have
more inter-links, as illustrated in Fig. 1(d). See also Supplementary Fig. S1, where we show
the increase of the mean inter-degree as a function of m.
Given the model described above for generating random modular networks, we proceed
to study percolation properties for such networks. We consider a modular Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)
network [23, 24] where both the intra- and inter-connectivity are Poisson distributed with
means kintra and kinter respectively. Using the generating function approach presented in [8]
(see full details in the Supplementary Information), we find that in the presence of random
nodes failure, the giant component emerges when the following is satisfied
(1− kintra)(1− kintra − (m− 2)kinter
m− 1 )−
kinter
2
m− 1 = 0. (5)
This condition yields k = kintra + kinter = 1 for every m, recovering the standard result
for single networks without communities. Thus, in the case of random node failure the
percolation threshold only depends on the mean degree, k.
However, in real systems the interconnected nodes are often more exposed to failure than
other nodes. For example, it has been shown that aging and schizophrenia could result in
damage to the interconnected nodes in brain networks [12, 13]. In addition, it is often the
case that interconnected nodes are considered to be important; for example, the New York
City and London airports, which provide an attractive target for attacks [3]. Therefore, in
the following, we consider an attack on modular ER networks where the interconnected nodes
are randomly removed. Let ri(k1, k2, . . . , km) be the occupation probability of a node from
module i with k1 links in module 1, k2 links in module 2 and etc. When the interconnected
nodes are randomly removed, this probability is given by
ri(k1, k2, . . . , km) =

1, if
m∑
j=1
j 6=i
kj = 0
q, otherwise
, (6)
4where q is the probability that a randomly chosen interconnected node is occupied. Let p
be the general occupation probability, i.e. the probability that a randomly chosen node is
occupied. Since the probability for a node to be interconnected is 1− e−kinter , i.e. one minus
a Poisson distribution with mean kinter at 0, we obtain
q =
p− e−kinter
1− e−kinter . (7)
We extend Callaway et al.’s approach [25] for studying the robustness of networks to
intentional attacks, from single-module networks to modular networks in a similar approach
as in [8] (see full details in the Methods section), and solve for the occupation probabil-
ity given in (6), obtaining two possible solutions for the critical occupation probability of
interconnected nodes
qc = 0 (8)
qc =
−b+√b2 − 4ac
2a
(9)
where a = kintrakintere
−kinter
b = kintra + kinter − kintrae−kinter − kintrakintere−kinter
c = kintrae
−kinter − 1.
From these solutions, we obtain the critical occupation probability pc, using Eq. (7).
Due to symmetry, once the giant component emerges (p > pc) the fraction of nodes of
module i in the giant component equals to the total fraction of nodes in the giant component,
Si = S, and one obtains,
S = e−kinter(1− q)(1− e−kintraS) + q(1− e−(kintraS+kinterS)). (10)
For kintra = 0, only a fraction q of the nodes in the network are connected, and one obtains
S = q(1− e−kS), recovering the standard result for percolation in single networks [23, 24].
In Fig. 2, we confirm our analytical solution (Eqs. (8)-(10)) by extensive numerical simu-
lation of ER modular networks of size N = 600 000. First, we show the percolation threshold
as a function of the number of modules m where the mean degree is kept fixed k = 4 and
α = 100, see Fig. 2(a). Similar results are shown for α = 10, and 1000 in Supplementary
Fig. S2. Let m∗ be the transition point where the two analytical solutions cross each other.
5In the regime where m < m∗ the attack on interconnected nodes mainly breaks the connec-
tivity between the modules leaving their internal structure intact. Thus, only the removal
of all the interconnected nodes (qc = 0) breaks down the giant component.
In order to illustrate this effect, in Fig. 3 we visualize the giant component at S = 0.1
(close to total collapse) with interconnected nodes shown in black and all other nodes colored
according to the module they belong to. For a network with m = 4 < m∗, random node
failure destroys the internal structure of the modules evenly, see Fig. 3(a). In this random
failure case, all the modules always appear in the giant component (i.e. there is always at
least one node from each module in the giant component) as shown in Fig. 3(e), and the
size of modules is very narrowly distributed, see Fig. 3(g). In contrast to random failure,
when attacking the interconnected nodes (at S = 0.1), see Fig. 3(b), not all the modules
remain in the giant component (for example, in Fig. 3(b) there are only two of them).
However, the modules that do remain, are almost intact, containing 14.6% of their initial
nodes, significantly more than in the random case. This point is demonstrated also in
Supplementary Figs. S5-S6 where we analyze the modules structure in the second largest
cluster.
In contrast, for m > m∗, the interconnected nodes play an important role also in the
internal structure of modules and therefore there is no need to remove all of them in order
to break down the giant component. Nevertheless, the attack still leaves them more complete
than in the case of random removal, see Fig. 3(c)-(d). Furthermore, in the case of attack,
usually all modules appear in the giant component (see Fig. 3(f)), and thus their relative
size is smaller compared to the m < m∗ case (see Fig. 3(g)). As m increases, the difference
between attack and random case becomes smaller, and as a result the percolation threshold
converges to the one obtained for random failure, see Supplementary Fig. S3.
For the case of m < m∗, the attack of interconnected nodes has a weak effect on the
internal structure of the modules, and the removal of inter-module nodes results in an abrupt
decrease in the size of the giant component, see Fig. 2(b). In addition, while for m = 100 >
m∗ (Fig. 2(c)) we observe a regular second order percolation transition characterized by the
continuous decrease of S and the sharp peak in Ssecond, the case of m < m
∗ demonstrates an
abrupt, first order transitions. The reason is that the second largest cluster contains large
connected subgraphs corresponding to modules who “dropped” from the giant component,
see Fig. 3(e). Therefore, with the emergence of the giant component, these modules become
6part of it, leading to a sudden drop in the size of the second largest cluster.
In Fig. 2(d), we show the critical number of modules, m∗, as a function of α for networks
with mean degree k = 4. It is seen that m∗ is increasing with α, and the percolation
threshold at this point is pc
∗ ≈ 0.3417 independent of α, meaning the transition takes place
at a fixed inter-module average degree kinter
∗ = − ln(pc∗) ≈ 1.0738. We show how the critical
percolation threshold pc
∗ and the critical mean inter-degree kinter
∗ are changing with k in
Supplementary Fig. S4.
In order to further demonstrate the transition in the pc behavior, in Fig. 2(e) we show the
percolation threshold as a function of kinter for networks with mean intra-degree kintra = 2
and number of modules m = 10 fixed. Here we see a similar transition in pc as before,
but the critical point is now a function of the concentration of interconnected nodes. At a
critical k∗inter = kinter ≈ 0.693, pc changes from Eq. (8) behavior to Eq. (9).
Finally, in modular structures the interconnected nodes have high betweenness centrality
(see Fig. S11), and thus, our framework also provides an analytical tool of studying attacks
on high betweenness centrality nodes, where only numerical simulations currently exist that
suggest such an attack is one of the most harmful attack strategies [9, 10]. Figure S11
compares the betweenness centrality of nodes with inter-module connections (called inter-
nodes) and nodes with only intra-module connections (called intra-nodes) for networks of size
N = 100 000 with m = 10 modules. First, we show that the average betweenness centrality
of interconnected nodes is significantly higher than for nodes without interconnections in
networks with mean intra-degree kintra = 2 and a varying number of interconnections, see
Fig. S11(a). Then, for kinter = 2, we show that the betweenness centrality distribution of
interconnected nodes has a broader tail, meaning that interconnected nodes are much more
likely to have high betweenness centrality. In Supplementary Fig. S7 we obtain similar
results in networks with k = 4 and different values of α. Thus, our analytical results of
attack on interconnected nodes can be regarded as a theory for attacking high betweenness
nodes.
Our analytical and numerical investigation of the effect of modularity on network stability
has important implications for real world networks, such as cognitive and neural brain net-
works. The modular architecture of neural structural and functional networks is considered a
fundamental principle of the brain [26]. This non-random modular architecture is crucial for
the brain’s functional demands of segregation and integration of information [27]. In fact,
7disrupted brain modular organization is related to neuropathology, such as schizophrenia
[28], autism [29], Alzheimer’s [30] and impulsivity [31]. Nevertheless, research investigating
any possible negative aspects of modular organization in brain networks is lacking. At the
cognitive level (the level of information processing in the brain), network analysis is mainly
focused on language and memory networks [32]. Yet, knowledge on modular effect and
importance in cognitive network organization is limited. Recently, the semantic memory
organization of persons with Asperger syndrome was compared to that of neurotypical con-
trols using network analysis [33]. This research found that the semantic memory network of
persons with Asperger syndrome is more modular than that of neurotypical matched con-
trols. The authors suggest that this “hyper-modularity” is related to the Asperger syndrome
rigidity of thought, e.g. difficulty in comprehending high level aspects of language. Thus,
modular organization can have a negative effect on real world networks by leading to rigidity
of the network which might hinder proper network function.
Finally, our study offers an efficient immunization approach in modular networks, where
epidemic spreading can be prevented at a lower cost by immunizing interconnected nodes.
For both regimes, below and abovem∗, the percolation threshold obtained from attacking the
interconnected nodes is higher than the case of random failure and therefore immunization
of these nodes is more effective. For the regime m < m∗, this can be done at a very low cost
as the percolation threshold is very high. Thus, in geographically distant social networks,
it is worth vaccinating people that link between different communities such as businessmen
traveling a lot between countries.
METHODS
We give a brief derivation of our analytical solution (Eqs. (8)-(10)). We extend Callaway
et al.’s approach [25] for studying the robustness of networks to intentional attacks, from
single-module networks to modular networks in a similar manner that was done in [8]. We
define the generating functions for the degree and excess degree distributions of occupied
nodes
Fi(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
∞∑
k1,k2,...,km=0
pik1,k2,...,km r
i
k1,k2,...,km x1
k1x2
k2 . . . xm
km (11)
8Fij(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
∞∑
k1,k2,...,km=0
qijk1,k2,...,km r
i
k1,k2,...,km x1
k1x2
k2 . . . xm
km (12)
where pik1,k2,...,km is the probability that a node from module i has degree (k1, k2, . . . , km),
qijk1,k2,...,km is the probability of following a randomly chosen ij-edge to a node with excess
degree (k1, k2, . . . , km), and r
i
k1,k2,...,km is the occupation probability of a node with degree
(k1, k2, . . . , km) defined in (6). By substituting (6) into (11)-(12), in the case of modular ER
networks with average intra- and inter-degree kintra, kinter respectively, we obtain
Fi(x) = e
kintra(xi−1)−kinter(1− q) + qGi(x) (13)
Fij(x) =

∂Fi
∂xj
(x)m−1
kinter
= qGi(x), if i 6= j
∂Fi
∂xi
(x) 1
kintra
= Fi(x), otherwise
(14)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and Gi(x) is the generating function of the degree distribution,
see Supplementary Information. We define the generating function for the distribution of
the number of occupied nodes in the component reachable by following a randomly chosen
ij-edge to a i-node and then following its additional outgoing links
Jij(x) = 1− Fij(1) + xiFij[J1i, J2i, . . . , Jmi]. (15)
And similarly, the distribution of the number of nodes reachable from a randomly chosen
i-node (rather than ij-edge) is generated by
Ji(x) = 1− Fi(1) + xiFi[J1i, J2i, . . . , Jmi]. (16)
Then, the average number of occupant j-nodes in the component of a randomly chosen
i-node, is given by
〈si〉j =
∂Ji
∂xj
(x)|x=1
= δijFi(1) +
∂Fi
∂xj
(1)
∂Jii
∂xj
(1) +
m∑
l=1
l 6=i
∂Fi
∂xl
(1)
∂Jli
∂xj
(1)
= δijFi(1) + kintraFi(1)
∂Jii
∂xj
(1) + q
kinter
m− 1
m∑
l=1
l 6=i
∂Jli
∂xj
(1). (17)
Solving the system (17), see full details in the Supplementary Information, we obtain the
critical occupation probability of interconnected nodes in which the average component size
9diverges, given in Eqs. (8)-(9). Finally, once the giant component emerges (p > pc), the
fraction of i-nodes belonging to the giant component, Si, is given by
Si = 1− Ji(1) = Fi(1)− Fi(u1i, u2i, . . . , umi) (18)
where uji = 1− Sj, yielding Eq. (10).
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FIG. 1. Visualization of the model for generating random modular networks. (a)-
(c) Illustration of the effect of α on the obtained modular network using Gephi with force atlas
layout [22, 34], on a network of size N = 10 000 with mean degree k = 8 divided into m = 5
modules. (d) Illustration of the effect of the number of modules m on the obtained network with
a number of inter-module links increasing with the number of modules. Inter-connected nodes are
shown in red.
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FIG. 2. Two percolation regimes when attacking interconnected nodes. (a) pc as a
function of m calculated for networks with k = 4, α = 100. Simulation points obtained from at
least 1000 simulation runs of networks of size N = 600 000. Solid lines represent the analytical
result obtained in (8)-(9). (b)-(c) Fraction of nodes in the largest cluster S and second largest
cluster Ssecond as a function of occupation probability p. Solid lines represent the analytical result
obtained in (10). (d) Critical number of modules m∗, defined as the point where the solutions from
(8) and (9) cross each other, as a function of α. pc
∗ is the percolation threshold at this point. (e)
pc as a function of kinter calculated for networks with m = 10, kintra = 2.
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FIG. 3. Size of modules in the giant component at S = 0.1. Visualization is shown for
networks of size N = 12 000 with mean degree k = 4 and α = 10, at the point where the giant
component contains 10% of the nodes (S = 0.1) (a),(c) for random node removal, (b),(d) for attack
on interconnected nodes. (e)-(f) Distribution of the number of modules in the giant component
and second largest component at S = 0.1. A module is considered to be part of a component if at
least one of its nodes are part of the component. (g) Distribution of the size of modules in the giant
component at S = 0.1, normalized by the initial module size. Note that in (g), the size of modules
is measured by reconstructing the graph of each module in the giant component, and counting
its number of nodes in this graph. In other words, interconnected nodes that have been detached
from their original module are not considered. Results obtained by at least 1000 simulation runs
of networks of size N = 600 000 with mean degree k = 4.
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Resilience of modular complex networks:
Supplementary Information
Saray Shai, Dror Y. Kenett, Yoed N. Kenett, Miriam Faust, Simon Dobson,
and Shlomo Havlin
I. INTRODUCTION
We present supplementary material on our paper: “Resilience of modular complex net-
works”. First, in section II we describe in more details the derivation of the analytical
solution presented in the main text. Then, in section III, we examine the properties of our
model for generating random modular networks. In section IV we further discuss the two
percolation regimes found in the analytical framework and their implications. In section V
we examine the internal structure of modules in the second largest cluster, and finally in
section VI we discuss the betweenness centrality of interconnected nodes in modular struc-
tures.
II. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
A. Random failure
First, we give full derivation of Eq. (5) in the main text. The generating function for the
degree and excess degree distribution (see [1]) of modular ER networks with average intra-
and inter-degree kintra, kinter respectively is given by
Gi(x) = e
kintra(xi−1)e
kinter
m−1
∑
j 6=i
(xj−1)
(S1)
Gij(x) =

∂Gi
∂xj
(x)
∂Gi
∂xj
(1)
= kinter
m−1Gi(x)
m−1
kinter
= Gi(x), if i 6= j
∂Gi
∂xj
(x)
∂Gi
∂xj
(1)
= kintraGi(x)
1
kintra
= Gi(x), otherwise
(S2)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm). Then from [1], the average number of j-nodes in the component
of a randomly chosen i-node is given by
〈si〉j = δij + kintra
∂Hi
∂xj
(1) +
kinter
m− 1
m∑
l=1
l 6=i
∂Hl
∂xj
(1) (S3)
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where δij denotes the Kronecker delta and
Hij(x) = xiGij[H1i, H2i, . . . , Hmi] ; Hi(x) = xiGi[H1i, H2i, . . . , Hmi] (S4)
For example, using the notation hi =
∂Hi
∂x1
(1), the system obtained for 〈s1〉1 is:
h1 = 1 + kintrah1 +
kinter
m− 1(h2 + h3 + . . .+ hm)
h2 = kintrah2 +
kinter
m− 1(h1 + h3 + . . .+ hm)
...
hm = kintrahm +
kinter
m− 1(h1 + h2 + . . .+ hm−1) (S5)
Summing equations for h2, . . . hm, we obtain:
h2 + h3 + ...+ . . . hm = kinterh1 + (kintra +
m− 2
m− 1kinter(h2 + h3 + . . . hm)
⇒ h2 + h3 + . . . hm = kinterh1
1− kintra − m−2m−1kinter
(S6)
Substituting into (S5), we obtain:
h1 = 1 + kintrah1 +
kinter
m− 1(h2 + h3 + . . .+ hm)
=1 + kintrah1 +
kinter
m− 1(
kinterh1
1− kintra − m−2m−1kinter
)
⇒ h1(1− kintra −
k2inter
m−1
1− kintra − m−2m−1kinter
) = 1
⇒ h1 =
1− kintra − m−2m−1kinter
(1− kintra)(1− kintra − m−2m−1kinter)− kinter
2
m−1
. (S7)
h1 diverges when (1 − kintra)(1 − kintra − (m−2)kinterm−1 ) − kinter
2
m−1 = 0. This is also where all hi
diverges, yielding Eq. (5) in the main text.
B. Attack on interconnected nodes
In the case of attack on interconnected nodes, the average number of j-nodes in the
component of a randomly chosen i-node is given by
〈si〉j = δijFi(1) + kintraFi(1)
∂Jii
∂xj
(1) + q
kinter
m− 1
m∑
l=1
l 6=i
∂Jli
∂xj
(1). (S8)
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where
Fi(x) = e
kintra(xi−1)−kinter(1− q) + qGi(x)
Fij(x) =

∂Fi
∂xj
(x)m−1
kinter
= qGi(x), if i 6= j
∂Fi
∂xi
(x) 1
kintra
= Fi(x), otherwise
Jij(x) = 1− Fij(1) + xiFij[J1i, J2i, . . . , Jmi]
Ji(x) = 1− Fi(1) + xiFi[J1i, J2i, . . . , Jmi] (S9)
For example, using the notation jij =
∂Jij
∂x1
(1), the system obtained for 〈s1〉1 is:
j11 = F1(1) + kintraF1(1)j11 + q
kinter
m− 1(j21 + j31 + . . .+ jm1)
j12 = q + q kintra j11 + q
kinter
m− 1(j21 + j31 + . . .+ jm1)
...
j1m = q + q kintra j11 + q
kinter
m− 1(j21 + j31 + . . .+ jm1)
j21 = q kintra j22 + q
kinter
m− 1(j12 + j32 + . . .+ jm2)
j22 = kintraF2(1)j22 + q
kinter
m− 1(j12 + j32 + . . .+ jm2)
...
j2m = q kintra j22 + q
kinter
m− 1(j12 + j32 + . . .+ jm2)
...
jm1 = q kintra jmm + q
kinter
m− 1(j1m + j3m + . . .+ jm−1m)
jm2 = q kintra jmm + q
kinter
m− 1(j1m + j3m + . . .+ jm−1m)
...
jmm = kintraFm(1)jmm + q
kinter
m− 1(j1m + j3m + . . .+ jm−1m)
(S10)
19
Since F1(1) = Fi(1) = e
−kinter(1− q) + q for all i, we can sum all equations for jii obtaining:
j11 + j22 + · · ·+ jmm = F1(1) + kintraF1(1)(j11 + j22 + · · ·+ jmm)+
+ q
kinter
m− 1(j12 + j13 + . . .+ j1m + . . .+ jm1 + jm2 + . . .+ jmm−1)
(S11)
Summing for all equations jil for i 6= l we obtain
j12 + j13 + . . .+ j1m + . . .+ jm1 + jm2 + . . .+ jmm−1 = (m− 1)q + (m− 1) q kintra(j11 + · · ·+ jmm)+
+ q kinter(j12 + j13 + . . .+ j1m + . . .+ jm1 + jm2 + . . .+ jmm−1)
⇒ j12 + j13 + . . .+ j1m + . . .+ jm1 + jm2 + . . .+ jmm−1 = (m− 1)q + (m− 1) q kintra(j11 + · · ·+ jmm)
1− q kinter
(S12)
And by substituting (S12) into (S11), we obtain
j11 + · · ·+ jmm = F1(1) + kintraF1(1) + q
2 kinter
1− q kinter +
q2 kintra kinter(j11 + · · ·+ jmm)
1− q kinter
⇒ j11 + · · ·+ jmm = F1(1)(1− q kinter) + q
2 kinter
(1− kintraF1(1))(1− q kinter)− q2 kintra kinter (S13)
leading to the critical occupation probability of interconnected nodes (in which the average
component size diverges) given in Eqs. (8)-(9) in the main text.
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III. MODEL FOR GENERATING RANDOM MODULAR NETWORKS
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FIG. S5. The effect of α on the convergence of kinter to the mean degree. According
to the model described in the main text, kinter is increasing with m taking into consideration that
systems comprised of more modules have more inter-links accordingly. At the limit of large m,
kinter is approaching the mean degree in a rate determined by α.
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IV. TWO PERCOLATION REGIMES
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FIG. S6. Two percolation regimes when attacking interconnected nodes. Here we show
the two percolation regimes discussed in the main text for α = 10 and α = 1000. Results shown are
for networks with fixed mean degree k = 4. As discussed in the main text, the regime of m < m∗,
corresponds to qc = 0, is characterized by an abrupt first order transition, while for m > m
∗ we
observe a regular second order percolation transition characterized by the continuous decrease of
S and the sharp peak in Ssecond.
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FIG. S7. Convergence of pc to 1/kinter. Analytical results for α = 100. Red lines represent pc
obtained from Eq. (9) in the main text, blue lines shows 1/kinter and green lines shows m
∗. Since
unlike random node removal, nodes with no links are never removed in the attack, pc is converging
to 1/k+ e−k. Here we show that indeed for higher degrees than shown in the main text, our model
is converging to the percolation threshold of random removal as the number of modules increases.
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FIG. S8. Changing of p∗c and k
∗
inter as the mean degree increases. The percolation
threshold p∗c and the mean inter-degree k∗inter at the transition point between the two regimes
(where the two solutions for pc cross) as a function of k. In the main text we show results for k = 4
where p∗c ≈ 0.3417 and k∗inter ≈ 1.0738 (vertical lines).
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V. MODULES STRUCTURE IN THE SECOND LARGEST CLUSTER
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FIG. S9. Size of the second largest cluster at S=0.1. Distribution of the size of the second
largest cluster at S = 0.1 for α = 10. The size of the second largest cluster is significantly larger
(more than two orders of magnitude) in the case of attack for m = 4 < m∗, in agreement with
the abrupt first order transition seen in Fig. 2. As mentioned in the main text, this is caused by
large modules (i.e. modules that were not much damaged by the attack) that “dropped” from the
giant component. For m = 6 > m∗, the attack still results in larger second clusters, in comparison
to the random attack, because it contains subgraphs (i.e. modules) with more complete internal
structure. As m increases, the difference in sizes disappears.
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FIG. S10. Size of modules in the second largest cluster at S=0.1. Distribution of the sizes
of modules in the second largest component at S = 0.1 for α = 10. Modules sizes are normalized
by the initial module size. Here we can see that the differences in the size of the second cluster
discussed above (Fig. S5), are indeed originate at big modules that “dropped” from the largest
component. These modules are getting smaller as m increases since for a large number of modules,
the number of interconnected nodes is large, and removing them is damaging the internal structure
of modules, just like random node failure.
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VI. BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY OF INTERCONNECTED NODES IN
MODULAR STRUCTURES
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FIG. S11. Betweenness centrality of interconnected nodes for various α. Betweenness
centrality of inter-nodes (nodes that have at least one interconnection) and intra-nodes (nodes
with only intraconnections) in networks of size N = 100 000 with m = 10 modules, mean degree
k = 4 and α = 10, 100, 1000 respectively. This figure further illustrates the point that in modular
structures the interconnected nodes have high betweenness centrality.
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